How to Win in Afghanistan: Part II
August 25th, 2009 by Wil Robinson
Almost a full eight years into the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, there are still three institutional sources of violence in the country: the Taliban, the warlords, and the foreign occupation. Each of these institutions feed off each other, generating a vicious cycle that Afghanistan appears unable to break.
The only winning strategy in Afghanistan is reconstruction. No modernized army, no precision-guided missiles from unmanned aircraft, no democratic elections, no secular government, no decapitation of the insurgency’s leadership, and not even ridding the country of the burqa will secure the country. What is needed – purely and simply – is massive reconstruction: economic development, substantial infrastructure, agricultural and land reforms, an educational genesis, and healthcare facilities.
Aside from obvious statistics that catch the ethno-centric eyes of major U.S. media outlets (i.e., 2009 being the deadliest year for U.S. troops), the reality for Afghans is much worse. Today’s coordinated bombings in Kandahar, killing more than 40 civilians, is just one such sign.
Adding to the Taliban’s indiscriminate attacks are the ongoing U.S. airstrikes from unmanned drones, which often seem just as indiscriminate, essentially forming a nasty de facto cooperation between the Taliban and Western forces that terrorizes the civilian population.
Our bombs from the skies – killing villagers, elders, children, and wedding parties along the way – recruit more Taliban insurgents. Insurgents who otherwise might have been secular-minded, progressive, and liberal – until Grandma was blown up by an airstrike because someone safely ensconced in a military base hundreds of miles away was told the #2 terrorist was meeting at her neighbor’s home. Once an insurgent joins the fight, they are simultaneously indoctrinated into extremist ideology, and an understandable resentment of foreign occupation turns into a religious obligation.
![[...U.S.-led airstrikes killed 555 civilians in 2008 (of those reported). Compare that to the 730 killed by Taliban suicide bombings...]](http://www.internationalpoliticalwill.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/civilian-afghans.jpg)
[...U.S.-led airstrikes killed 555 civilians in 2008 (of those reported). Compare that to the 730 killed by Taliban suicide bombings...]
When NATO forces account for almost the same number and percentage of civilian deaths as the Taliban’s suicide bombs…well, we’ve lost that war.
The foreign occupation is also fueling the warlords and their grip on the country. Briefcases of money are doled out to those landowners and tribal leaders who are willing to sell their loyalty. Warlords that have ruled through terror and an unequal accumulation of wealth and power see the foreign military as a way to further their personal quest for control. They become power brokers, choosing leaders and politicians, directing legislation, running the opium trade, and all the while settling decades-old feuds and personal vendettas. The U.S. military incorrectly believes that because these warlords are not “religious Muslims,” they are a natural ally.
![[...do you think Afghans care what the guy behind the automatic machine gun mounted on a pickup calls himself a "Taliban" or "Warlord?"...]](http://www.internationalpoliticalwill.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/warlord.jpg)
[...do you think Afghans care if the guy behind the automatic machine gun mounted on a pickup calls himself a "Taliban" or "Warlord?"...]
Except the “tip” that someone was probably paid for that claimed the #2 terrorist was meeting in some village came from one of these warlords – and, conveniently, some of the “collateral damage” happened to be members of his rival’s gang. That sort of makes us paid assassins…
Critics of the idea that our presence might be making things worse (or “patriots” as they will call themselves) claim that leaving Afghanistan to the Taliban would be akin to turning over Germany to the Nazis during World War II (they always conveniently leave out the warlords, since I guess we consider these murderers our allies). Ignoring the discredited logic that equates every scenario to the Nazis or Hitler, there is a major flaw in this criticism.
Once the Nazi regime was toppled in Germany, the U.S. moved into massive reconstruction. The vacuum created by the fall of the Nazis was replaced with economic recovery, foreign assistance, and – essentially – hope. The foreign occupation was largely ignored because so much else was going on to improve the lives of ordinary Germans.
While we followed up the toppling of the Nazis in Germany with years of economic reconstruction, we have followed the fall of the Taliban in early 2002 with years of military occupation and military funding.
Between 1946 and 1952, the U.S. alone supplied Germany with more than $29 billion (adjusted for inflation) in reconstruction aid. Of that total, only about 10% – $3 billion – was for the military. The rest was used for economic recovery and emergency food aid. (Japan received about $15 billion during the same period – with only $600,000 for the military.)
That is how you win hearts and minds – and avoid a decade-long insurgency.
Afghanistan, on the other hand, in roughly the same time span (2001-2008) has received almost $38 billion in US aid. Tragically, more than $22 billion – or 58% – was military aid. How can we expect to build peace with so much money for war?
And of course, none of that takes into account the fact that much of this aid in Afghanistan is used to pay private (Western) contractors for the reconstruction projects (instead of hiring local Afghans, much as the Marshall Plan hired local Germans). These figures also don’t reflect the massive corruption and funds skimmed by those same warlords that claim to be our allies, nor the massive bureaucratic costs for the (Western) “consultant” community in the guise of humanitarian experts. Nor does it break down how much of this “aid” is really just briefcase bribes to (again) the warlords.
Without a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan – one that genuinely seeks to reconstruct the country at the local level – we are facing another decade of violence. Another decade of “troop surges” and “climbing casualties.” Another decade of rampant corruption and crime by the warlords, and infinitely more rounds of “let’s kill another #2 terrorist so we can look good for a day in the newspapers.”
And Afghans are facing yet another decade of “collateral damage,” horrible life expectancy and infant mortality rates, and poverty.
Tags: united states, Afghanistan, terrorism, media, military
I see two large difficulties with such plans:
1. How do we ensure our resources are being used to better the Afghani people? We provides guns to the Afghani Army,only to find the same weapons to be used against us three months down the road. We provide money for a school only to find that it has been siphoned off to a governor’s personal estate.
2. How do we protect what we build? I remember a post at Registan.net detailing the story of attempted road construction in one of the Southeast provinces. Local militants told town elders they would kill any body who helped build, or used, the road. The road never was finished.
These challenges need to be overcome if we wish to stabilize Afghanistan.
Unless the Afghans find gold or oil beneath their soil I don’t believe reconstruction will happen. It just seems the U.S. and a few other western nations simply cannot find common politic, economics or cultural connections with much of the Middle East and countries like Afghanistan.
I’m speculating here, but perhaps the region needs to deal with itself without outside influence. If it’s warlords, the Taliban or moderate governments - what happens, happens.
Some of those insidious values we deplore, blood feuds, family misogyny, sexual chauvinism, clan retribution with other clans, equating death and honor as necessity, retaliatory vengeance, etc… That stuff has been going on for centuries in that region and I don’t think intervening enlightened governments, new businesses and roads will change a thing.
T. Greer–
As to your first point - we already have problems with wondering where money is going, who is siphoning it off, etc. I’m not saying hand over money to Afghans - I’m saying spend the money wisely, hire local Afghans to do the reconstruction work, and have only a few international consultants assisting the process. So in essence, we are already dealing with this problem now, yet we’ve continued to pour money into a broken system and use private contractors for much of the work.
Secondly, we don’t need to protect what “we” build - because it will be “them” building it - and they will protect it. Think of it this way - if someone comes into your neighborhood and builds a school (without ever hiring you to help with the work), and leaves - you have a school, still no job/no money, and not much vested interest. But if you’ve helped build that school - invested time, resources, etc. - you’re going to protect that school. We have to have Afghans have a vested interest in reconstruction - and if we are doing it for them- there’s no interest.
Having Afghans themselves build a road will assure that 1) it will be finished, and 2) it will be protected. But if we just come in with guns blazing, build a quick road (often with little regard for where one really needs to be), who is going to risk anything to protect it? Half of the roads we’ve built have more to do with military strategy than they do with economic development.
Bill–
Of the 3 institutions of violence I mentioned - 1) the Taliban, 2) the warlords, and 3) foreign occupation, we have the immediate ability to control only one of those. So yes, less outside influence would be optimal.
It doesn’t mean total abandonment, it just means getting rid of 1/3 of the violence in the country - and perhaps filling that hole with some real reconstruction.
We’ve ignored Afghanistan long enough - since the early 1990s - we tried funding militias (which fueled extremism in the 80s), we tried ignoring it in the 90s (which allowed the Taliban to come into power), and now we’ve tried 8 years of military force. Why not try something different?
Wil-
Yes, we are already having problems wondering where the money is going.
And that is a problem. Before we funnel more money into the system, we need to fix the system. Your are right- we are already dealing it now. Which is why I suggest we overcome this problem before we rachet up aid a few levels.
I think you may be assuming too much. If a man came to your house with an AK47 and told you that if you filed your taxes, he would kill you, would you file your taxes?
Most Afghans are in the same situation. The Taliban owns the night. How shall your average Afghani fight back against such?
T. Greer–
If someone put an AK47 to my head and told me “don’t pay your taxes…” well, I’d be happy to oblige.
But that’s a different scenario.
Imagine instead that you are an Afghan living in a rural area. A foreigner (without guns or preconceived ideas about culture and modernity) came in with some money and asked what you needed in your village. You - being a farmer - decided that irrigation would be tremendous help. The foreigner said they would pay for the costs - and hire you to help build the irrigation system.
Salary for you - in addition to actually being asked what you needed.
So a couple months later, you have now earned a pretty penny building an irrigation system in your village, and additionally, your income from your farm is up also because you have increased your yield. Then, the same foreigner (again, without guns or ideas about what is considered “appropriate” religion/culture), comes in and says they have more money. What do you need now?
Well, now that you’re doing pretty good financially, you think a school for your kids would be helpful. This time the foreigner offers money to build the school, and hires your brother to help with construction. Then, once the school opens, you are asked to pay a nominal fee to pay the teachers’ salaries. Your kids are going to school, you have more income from your farm, your brother was able to get ahead on his own business selling XYZ with the money he earned from building the school - and everyone’s doing better.
Add to this fact that the foreigner never asked if anyone was Taliban - anyone who wanted to work, wanted to build a school, etc. - was included. The foreigner did not bring in “private contractors” to do the work. They did not hire private contractors with Blackwater guards to even transport the materials into the village - that was also hired out to local villagers to drive the trucks.
Now - imagine that Taliban guy (who must be from outside your village since everyone in your village is quite happy with the recent reconstruction) shows up to your door with an AK47 and tells you to help him blow up the school, the dams, the canals, etc.
What would you say?
Great post, Wil, the subject on which I blogged too some time back. It is a vicious cycle and difficult to know what to do. Probably pull out.
Wil, that sounds all nice and fine, but it seems a tad unrealistic. Who says - particularly in Pashtun land - that the takfiri will wait until your community has built a new irrigation system, school, and road before they act? More likely is that the Taliban will come the day after our nice, unarmed, open-minded Westerner leaves town. He then kills two or three people who talked to this Westerner and tell the rest of you that supporting these projects will result in a similar fate. And hey, who will be there to stop him?
On an entirely unrelated note, I have written a post for the Stage I think you might be interested in. I would welcome your opinion on the matter discussed in the post, if you should feel so inclined.
T. Greer–
The “Westerner” doesn’t have to be white - nor do they have to be that visible. When I was in Kabul, I talked with one woman (Rangina Hamidi) who was raised in Virginia, came back to Kandahar after 2002. Now she runs a business for local women, and has no problems with the Taliban (even gets cooperation). Why? Because she’s not trying to change culture. Her work empowering women is not a threat to the Taliban because it works inside the framework of Afghan society.
It’s a good thesis, Wil, but how to implement it?
Great idea.
Not gonna happen. I don’t think they have achieved their objective, although who knows what that is?
U.S. might swap troops in Afghanistan Adding infantry units, sending home support staff possible
Wednesday, September 2, 2009 2:59 AM
All of that would require a drastic change in U.S. Foreign Policy, like a 180 degree change. Ain’t gonna happen. The U.S. Corporate/Military/Industrial Complex would never allow it. You have a better chance at a precipitous withdrawal. The powers in charge of our government have no concern for the welfare of humanity; only their natural resources. The U.S. is not just there to build, secure, and control a pipeline for the removal of the Caspian Basin Oil Reserves. There is a much bigger booty to be had.
This was a very idealistic post, Wil, and I applaud you! It’s a shame people of your calibre aren’t running things.
Bill–
There IS plenty of gold, see the above link.
BT–
“Idealism” implies impracticality. But these ideas are far from impractical. In fact, they may represent the only solution we’ve yet to try.
Face it - we “precipitously withdrew” after the Soviets got kicked out - and ended up back again a decade later.
And now in Washington, the powers that be are mulling what “new strategy” is needed - but everyone seems to assume that “strategy” HAS to contain weapons and war. How is that new? That’s no new - it’s just the same thing we’ve done before - but with more weapons.
So we can slog through another 10 years, or we can withdraw slowly, fastly, whatever.
Or we can try something “new” (and really, it’s not new, because it’s been tried - and succeeded before - in Europe/Japan after WWII).
But the same old thinking will get us into the same old problems.
I would say one of the major reasons post Second World War Germany had so much Allied funds pumped into it was the beginnings of the Cold War… Similarly with Japan (Russia, China, North Korea and Vietnam threats).
Jon–
I agree - the Cold War and the fight against Communism was a major factor.
But why is the spread of religious extremism any different? Aren’t we trying to convince people to abort an ideology that we feel is detrimental to society at large? If we tried to convince Europeans to stay away from Communism by reconstructing their society and providing an alternative social and economic system, why not do the same with regards to violent extremism?