International Political Will

Both presidential candidates agree that the insurgency in Afghanistan needs to be addressed. Yet neither senator has a clue about how to go about it.

The idea of a “surge,” similar to the troop increase in Iraq (which still hasn’t returned to pre-“surge” levels) seems to be the most popular choice. But despite the deification of General Petraeus and his counter-insurgency tactics, a carbon-copy of Iraq pasted onto Afghanistan won’t work.

Winning Afghans’ hearts and minds is the goal, and most would agree it starts with the economy. Understandably, violence in the country prevents many well-intentioned projects from moving forward. Therefore, a strategy to win in Afghanistan must simultaneously subdue levels of violence and visibly demonstrate to the people that the war effort will continue beyond killing terrorists. Afghans need to see that international troops have their eye on reconstruction – a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan - not a strategic drawdown that will leave a hole to be filled by remnants of the Taliban.

Winning will require money and real commitment. Here’s a five-point plan to succeed:

• Stop all air strikes. Immediately and completely.

Not another bomb should be dropped from an airplane in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Not one “smart-bomb” from an unmanned predator drone, not a “two-ton” bunker buster aimed at senior Taliban leaders, not so much as a grenade lobbed at a mud-brick house in a Hindu Kush village. Every civilian that is killed – mistakenly or not – by a U.S. or NATO bomb is a victory for the Taliban and a recruitment tool. Military strategists who are willing to accept collateral damage should take note that seven years of dropping bombs has not worked.

• Quadruple the size of the Afghan army.

The Afghan defense force currently stands at around 70,000 troops. U.S. policy wonks are bemoaning the low levels of US and NATO troops (around 60,000). How can 70,000 Afghans succeed where 60,000 of the best-trained and best-equipped troops in the world can’t?

Part of the reason the Taliban gains sympathy and is able to recruit is because of the large base of unemployed young men who only seek to protect their families. There is literally a pool of potential soldiers to pull from; so far, only the Taliban has been taking advantage of this. Increasing the size of the Afghan army to 300,000 would diminish the capacity of the Taliban to increase their numbers, lift hundreds of thousands out of poverty with a paycheck, and provide the kind of troop levels necessary to secure the entire country.

Allowing Afghans to form their own defense force would eliminate the need to send in more international troops. Existing ISAF troops could be used to train the Afghan army at a rapid pace.

• Buy every last bit of opium in the country.

The United Nations estimates the yearly opium crop generates as much as $3 billion through the drug trade, and this is the substantial source of financing for the Taliban. If international forces bought the entire crop directly from the farmers, they would eliminate the middle men, Taliban drug lords, smugglers, and virtually all of the Taliban’s funding. Afghan farmers grow the crop because it pays well; they will sell to whoever pays the most. If the fat-cats on Wall Street are worth $700 billion, then taking most of the world’s heroin off the streets and choking off the Taliban from their golden egg-laying hen has to be worth $2 or 3 billion.

• Guarantee the farmers the same price for their crop for the next 10 years provided they switch to growing food instead of opium.

$3 billion over 10 years is $30 billion – still a far cry from the $600+ billion spent in Iraq. Guaranteeing opium prices for food crops will ensure that farmers begin to build the country’s food reserves and keep billions of dollars out of the hands of terrorists. The price could be incrementally lowered over the years and the difference used to invest in local irrigation and agricultural infrastructure projects – something the locals would see and directly benefit from in the long-term.

• Outline major reconstruction projects and disseminate this information across the country.

Afghans need to know what the plan is, and is infamous for the low levels of literacy. Proposed projects and reconstruction plans need to be communicated directly to the people the same way they have for centuries – by word of mouth. Afghans can be hired to travel from village to village, telling their fellow countrymen and women what the international forces are doing to help them build their country. Call it propaganda – but if it’s backed up by action, it will serve to give Afghans hope that they will not be abandoned and left to the whims of the Taliban.

The underlying fear among Afghans is that the international forces will leave – just as they did after the Soviets were driven out. And what happens to those Afghans that refused quarter to the Taliban during the war with the Americans? International forces can leave and go home, but when the dust settles and the war is over, the Afghan family in a remote village of Helmand province will still be there. And if they think they will be staring across the valley at the leftover Taliban militants, you can be sure they are not going to give them reason to take revenge once big brother has left the building.

Once implementation of these five-points begins, the violence will drop. This will allow major reconstruction projects to begin and continue unimpeded, which means even more jobs for Afghans as contractors, electricians, laborers, school teachers, and shopkeepers. And more jobs means less chance of the people reverting to an insurgency. The system will feed on itself.

The task will not be cheap – but surely our leaders knew that before they started the war (or a second in Iraq). The cost of continuing our current policy will be even higher. We need to stop encouraging the insurgency with misguided air strikes, refusing to focus on infrastructure or economic reconstruction, and foolishly believing that peace can be achieved at the barrel of a gun.

The Rand Corporation recently analyzed 648 terrorist groups that ceased activity between 1968 and 2006. Only 7% of these terrorist organizations ended operations due to military tactics.

Are we willing to bet on 15 to 1 odds that we can save Afghanistan simply with brute military force?

Trackback URI | Comments RSS